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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RELIGIOUS LIBERTY-COMPULSORY MEDICAL
TREATMENT AGAINST THE WILL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF A PATIENT VIO-
LATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-In the
case of In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), the Su-
preme Court of Illinois was confronted with the question of whether an
otherwise competent adult, without minor children, who has become incom-
petent due to a physical and mental weakening brought on by approaching
death, can be judicially compelled to accept treatment (in the case under dis-
cussion, a blood transfusion) under court order, despite the fact that such
treatment would be against her will and religious convictions; and that for a
considerable time prior to such treatment, the adult had refused to accept it,
fully aware that such refusal would result in death. The court held that to
judicially compel such treatment, under the circumstances, would be an
unconstitutional infringement of the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as made applicable
to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bernice Brooks had entered the McNeal General Hospital in Chicago,
for treatment of a peptic ulcer. Her attending physician had been repeatedly
informed during a prior two year period that to receive blood transfusions
would be a violation of her religious and medical convictions.' Mrs. Brooks,
her husband, and their two adult children were members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses religious sect. Mrs. Brooks and her husband had signed a docu-
ment releasing the attending physician and the hospital from any civil
liability that could result from an omission of the administration of blood
transfusions, and, in return, Mrs. Brooks was assured that there would be
no further attempts to change her mind. Nevertheless, the attending physi-
cian, several assistant State's attorneys, and the public guardian's attorney
of Cook County, Illinois, petitioned the probate division of the circuit
court to appoint the public guardian as conservator 2 of the person of Mrs.
Brooks and also requested an order authorizing the conservator thus ap-
pointed to consent to the administration of a blood transfusion to Mrs.
Brooks: all this being done without notice to any member of the Brooks
family. As a result of this petition a conservator was appointed, the blood
transfusion was consented to by the conservator and the treatment was
successfully accomplished.
Mrs. Brooks and her husband then appealed directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court from the order of the probate division of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, seeking to have all orders of the conservatorship proceed-
1 For a brief discussion of appellants' religious beliefs and foundation thereof, see
In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 362-3, 205 N.E.2d 435, 436 (1965).
2 "CONSERVATOR. A guardian; protector; preserve." Black, Law Dictionary (4th
ed. 1951).
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ing expunged and the petition dismissed. The Constitution of the State of
Illinois allows for a direct appeal from a circuit court of the State to the
Illinois Supreme Court in cases in which a question arising out of either
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Illinois is
presented.3
The appellees first contended that as the blood transfusion had already
been given, the conservator discharged, and the estate closed, the cause had
thereby become moot and the appeal should be dismissed. The court rejected
the contention although it recognized the general rule that a moot case
will be dismissed.4 The court felt that the issues involved brought this
case within the exception to the general rule that an appeal will not be
dismissed when the moot issue is of substantial public interest.
5
The appellants' main contention was that a blood transfusion could not
be judicially forced upon her under the circumstances.
The court acknowledged the principle that the guarantees set out in
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are embraced within
the Fourteenth Amendment and are thereby made applicable to the States.6
Under the Fourteenth Amendment no State may deprive a person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. It follows, therefore, that a
State may deprive a person of certain religious rights or freedoms, provided
that the State acts within the bounds of due process of law.
While a person has a right to freedom of religion, the States have a
right to protect the public welfare, health or morals. Thus, two conflicting
interests are presented: the individual's right of freedom of religion, and
the States' right to protect the public welfare, health, and morals.
The court noted that the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution embraced two factors: the freedom of religious thought, which in
no way could be regulated, and the freedom of action in relation to religion
which could be regulated for the protection of society. 7
The appellees urged that society has a substantial interest in preserving
the lives of its citizens and that this interest is of greater importance than
appellant's right to choose between life and death because of a religious
conviction, and thus its act was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
To support this conclusion the appellees relied upon a number of cases
8 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 5.
4 People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949).
5 In determining whether a moot issue is of substantial public interest, the public
or private nature of the issue, the desirability of a determination for the guidance of
public officials, and the likelihood of a recurrence of the issue are factors which are taken
into consideration. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
6 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1940); School District of
Abington Township v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963).
7 Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 6.
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involving compulsory vaccinations,8 the proscription of polygamous mar-
riages, 9 the proscription of religious rituals involving snake handling,10 the
guardian consent to a transfusion for a minor child of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses," and the judicially compelled blood transfusion to an adult of the
Jehovah's Witnesses who was quick with child.12 The court, however, felt
that these were not controlling over the issue, as in each case society had
an interest to protect and could, within the bounds of due process of law,
deprive the persons involved therein of their rights to freedom of religion.
Hence, in each of these cases the right of society to protect the public
welfare, health or morals was a right superior to the right of the individual
to freedom of religion.
The court, after dispensing with these cases said;
It seems to be clearly established that the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution as extended to the individual States by
the Fourteenth Amendment to that Constitution, protects the abso-
lute right of every individual to freedom in his religious belief and
the exercise thereof, subject only to the qualification that the ex-
ercise thereof may properly be limited by governmental action
where such exercise endangers, clearly and presently, the public
health, welfare or morals. Those cases which have sustained gov-
ernmental action as against the challenge that it violated the
religious guarantees of the First Amendment have found the
proscribed practice to be immediately deleterious to some phase of
public welfare, health or morality. The decisions which have held
the conduct complained of immune from proscription involve no
such public injury and no danger thereof.'3
Proceeding to the facts of the Brooks case the court found that the
appellant's beliefs did not present a clear and present danger to society and
therefore an infringement upon these beliefs was unconstitutional. In
arriving at this conclusion the cout stated:
Applying the constitutional guarantees and the interpretations
thereof heretofore enunciated to the facts before us we find a
competent adult who has steadfastly maintained her belief that
acceptance of a blood transfusion is a violation of the law of God.
Knowing full well the hazards involved, she has firmly opposed
acceptance of such transfusions, notifying the doctor and hospital
of her conviction and desires, and executing documents releasing
both the doctor and the hospital from any civil liability which
might be thought to result from a failure on the part of either to
8 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1905).
9 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10
Sup. Ct. 299 (1890).
10 Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); Harden v. State,
188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
11 People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
12 Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
13 In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 441-2 (1965).
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administer such transfusions. No minor children are involved. No
overt or affirmative act of appellants offers any clear and present
danger to society-we have only a governmental agency compelling
conduct offensive to appellant's religious principles. Even though
we may consider appellant's beliefs unwise, foolish or ridiculous,
in the absence of an overriding danger to society we may not per-
mit interference therewith in the form of a conservatorship estab-
lished in the waning hours of her life for the sole purpose of
compelling her to accept medical treatment forbidden by her
religious principles, and previously refused by her with full knowl-
edge of the probable consequences. In the final analysis, what has
happened here involves a judicial attempt to decide what course of
action is best for a particular individual, notwithstanding that indi-
vidual's contrary views based upon religious convictions. Such
action cannot be constitutionally countenanced. 14
The orders of the probate division of the Circuit Court of Cook County
were accordingly reversed.
So, for the first time a court was presented with a set of facts which
would allow a decision that a person's freedom in his religious beliefs and
the exercise thereof would allow such person to choose between life and
death by an act of omission provided such action is based upon religious
beliefs and does not present a clear and present danger to the health,
welfare or morals of society. Previous cases with similar facts had been
decided contra on the basis of a clear and present danger to society, and
those concurring in legal conclusion were not cases wherein a life or death
issue was presented.
However, the Brooks case presented a factual situation in which the
court felt that the death of one person, without obligations to society, did
not of itself present a danger to society. Under these circumstances a person's
desire to conform to his religious beliefs, regardless of impending death, has
found support in a high State court. No matter how foolish a person's
religious beliefs may be generally thought to be, they may not be overriden
by a judicial order compelling the acceptance of medical treatment unless
a rejection of it presents a clear and present danger to society.
Unfortunately the problem may become one of an interpretation of
what constitutes a clear and present danger to society. The Illinois Supreme
Court has decided that the death of one person does not present a danger to
society, absent the passing of any burden onto that society. On the other
hand, those courts which find it disagreeable to allow a person to choose
death may employ a liberal attitude in construing what constitutes a clear
and present danger, and indeed may do so to the point of negating In re
Estate of Brooks and its effect. While the decision in the Brooks case is proper
from a legal standpoint, it is difficult to predict its effect on future litiga-
tion. Perhaps the most that can be said on the point is that the Brooks
14 Id. at 372-3; 205 N.E.2d at 442.
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case has established another limitation on the power of the courts to inter-
fere with the individual's choice between life and death-a limitation which
will undoubtedly be strictly and narrowly construed.
JEFFREY C. DANEK
ESCHEAT-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO E CHEAT-RIGHT TO ESCHEAT A DEBT
ACCORDED TO STATE OF CREDITOR'S LAST KNOWN ADDRESS.-In the recent
case of Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 85 Sup. Ct. 626 (1965), the United
States Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of whether the
right to escheat a debt should be accorded to the state having the most
"contacts" with the debt, the state of the debtor's incorporation, the state
where the debtor's principal offices were located, or the state of the creditor's
last known address.
In the case under discussion, the plaintiff, Texas, brought an action
against New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun Oil Company seeking an
injunction and declaration of rights for the purpose of determining which
state could acquire title to certain abandoned personal property through
escheat. The property in question consisted of various small debts' amount-
ing to about $26,000 which had accumulated on Sun's books over a period
of seven to forty years prior to the institution of this action. The debts
resulted from the failure of creditors to claim or cash checks and were
recorded on the books in Sun's two Texas offices.
The case was brought directly before the United States Supreme Court
under Art. III, § 2 of the United States Constitution which grants the Su-
preme Court original jurisdiction in cases "in which a state shall be a
party...." Previous suits had been brought by debtors who sought a declara-
tory judgment when certain property was escheated by a particular state
and they feared other states might later assert a right to escheat the same
property.2 But this was the first time that more than one state had been
made a party to the action.
Another state, Florida, was allowed to intervene when it asserted a
right to escheat that portion of the property owing to persons whose last
known address was in Florida.3 The Court assigned a master to hear the
case and to make appropriate reports. 4
1 Ely, Escheats: Perils & Precautions, 15 Bus. Law 791, 793-4 (1960), illustrates the
extent to which intangible personal property is today subject to escheat.
2 Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923); Anderson
National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 Sup. Ct. 599 (1943); Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 71 Sup. Ct. 822 (1950).
3 373 U.S. 948, 83 Sup. Ct. 1677 (1962). Illinois, which claimed no property involved
in this case, also sought to intervene to urge that the right to escheat a debt should
depend upon the laws of the state in which the debt was located. Leave to intervene
was denied. 372 U.S. 926, 83 Sup. Ct. 1108 (1962).
4 372 U.S. 926, 83 Sup. Ct. 869 (1962).
